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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often deployed in hostile and unattended environments; they are vulnerable 
to physical capture and compromise. In a node replication attack or a node clone attack, an adversary physically 
captures a sensor node, extracts cryptographic secrets from the node, and distributes a large number of replicas of 
captured node throughout the network, in order to launch a variety of insider attacks. Existing node clone attack 
detection schemes are mainly focused on stationary sensor networks. Also most existing detection schemes make 
unrealistic assumptions on the ability of replicas. In this paper, we propose a novel node clone attack detection 
protocol, namely the Single Hop Detection (SHD) protocol, which is fully distributed, highly robust against node 
colluding, specifically designed for mobile WSNs. We show analytically under popular mobility models that our 
protocol provides effective and robust node clone attack detection capability. 
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1. Introduction 
Once sensor nodes have been deployed in the area of interest, there will be minimal human 
intervention and monitoring. This can be problematic when the WSN is deployed in hostile environments. 
Nodes will be subjected to physical attacks in hostile environments. One important physical attack is 
the introduction of cloned nodes into the network. In a node replication attack or a node clone attack, an 
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adversary physically captures a sensor node, extracts cryptographic secrets from the node, and distributes 
an arbitrary number of replicas of captured node throughout the network. Replicated nodes, while 
controlled by the adversary, will be recognized as legitimate members of the network since they carry all 
cryptographic secrets extracted from captured node, and thus could be used by the adversary to launch a 
variety of insider attacks. 
Such attacks are very dangerous because they enable the attack to leverage the compromise of a 
limited number of nodes to exert control over a large part of the network, even subvert the whole 
network. The node clone attack can be the basis of a variety of attacks [1]. 
It would be a nontrivial task to detect clone attack in mobile sensor networks. Node mobility, replica 
colluding, and sideway attacks (attacks on dependent protocols such as routing protocols to subvert node 
clone detection protocols) are the main obstacles. 
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for detecting node clone attacks in mobile WSNs, namely the 
Single Hop Detection (SHD) protocol. Our contributions are the following. 
a) A majority of existing solutions are designed for stationary WSNs, adopting a location-based 
witness finding strategy, thus inherently not applicable to mobile WSNs due to node mobility. In SHD, 
Node mobility is not seen as a ‘devil’ property. Rather, mobility is exploited to help in clone detection. 
b) The protocol is highly robust against replica colluding attack; the protocol stands out even if 
replicas can communicate with one another at zero delay. 
c) The protocol is fully distributed. As its name suggests, all information exchange occurs in single- 
hop distance. Therefore, the detection protocol will stand in place even if there’s no reliable 
communication path between distant node pairs, which is likely to happen in a routing attack. 
d) We give theoretical results of the proposed protocol. With our protocol, the detection of node clone 
attack is deduced to an extended version of mobility-assisted routing problem. We give analytical results 
under popular mobility models such as Random Direction, Rand Waypoint etc. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce related works on node 
replication attack and mobility-assisted routing. In section 3, the network and security models are defined. 
Our proposed protocol SHD is presented in section 4 and the security and performance analysis are given 
in section 5. Finally, we conclude our work in section 6. 
2. Related Works 
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature to tackle node clone attacks. They all 
essentially try to detect the abnormal symptoms caused by replicas. 
A majority of existing schemes adopt a witness finding strategy, including RM and LSM [2], RED [3], 
Bloom Filter based detection protocols [4], Random Walk based protocols [5], and etc.  In the witness 
finding strategy, nodes are required to sign and transmit a location claim to its witness nodes. Two 
conflicting location claims that claim the same node ID (signed by the same key) appear at different 
locations, implies a node clone attack. Also there are other protocols, including key-usage-statistics-based 
protocol [6], fingerprint-based centralized detection protocol [7], and etc. 
There have been several new studies on node clone attack detection in mobile WSNs, such as XED [8], 
TDD and SDD [9], etc. 
Traditionally, mobility in mobile wireless sensor networks is considered as a necessary evil that has 
caused troubles to functionalities of WSNs such as routing and location discovery. However, in a 
mobility-assisted routing [10] protocol, mobility is exploited such that messages get carried by mobile 
nodes from the source to the destination. Mobile nodes carry a set of messages, and seek for opportunities 
to transmit it to the destination (or another mobile node) as they moves in the deployment field. 
In our proposed SHD protocol, mobility is exploited to help in clone detection. In Section 5, we show 
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that the detection delay of our proposed SHD protocol turns out to be an extended version of mobility-
assisted routing problem. 
3. Network and Threat Models 
In this paper, we consider a distributed mobile wireless sensor network, in which nodes are initially 
distributed evenly in a square of size N, and move according to a given mobility model, such as Random 
Waypoint or Random Direction. Note that we do not assume each node knows its location. This is a huge 
loose to network assumptions in that node positioning itself is a difficult problem to solve. 
We assume that identity-based public key system [11] is used so that each node only stores its own 
private key and a master public key. The private key is used to sign claim messages in our SHD protocol. 
We assume that the replicas may collude with each other to subvert the detection protocol, by making 
an aggressive assumption that replicas can communicate with each other at zero delay. Also we assume 
an active adversary. Specifically, we assume that during the execution of clone-detection protocol, the 
adversary can attack the routing protocol in use to selectively jam or disable a limited number of nodes. 
4. Single Hop Detection (SHD) Protocol 
In this section, we present our proposed Single Hop Detection (SHD) protocol. 
The SHD protocol exploits the fact that at any time, a physical node (or equivalently, its node ID and 
private key) cannot appear at different neighborhood community otherwise there must be replicas in the 
network. The neighborhood community of a node is characterized by its one-hop neighbor node list, 
which is readily available in a typical WSN since sensor nodes need to know their neighbors in order to 
communicate with each other. 
The SHD protocol consists of two phases, the fingerprint claim and the fingerprint verification phases.  
In the fingerprint claim phase, each node is required to sign its neighbor node list, using Algorithm 1 in 
Table 1. The signed neighbor node list is a fingerprint of its current neighborhood community, hereafter 
referred as fingerprint claim. The fingerprint claim is broadcasted in one-hop neighborhood. 
Upon reception of a fingerprint claim from a neighboring claim node, the receiver node will runs 
Algorithm 2 in Table 1 to decide whether to become a witness node of the claim node. When it decides to 
become a witness node, the node will then verify the fingerprint claim using Algorithm 3 in Table 2, and 
finally store the fingerprint claims of the witnessed nodes locally if the claim passed the verification 
process. 
In the fingerprint verification phase, when two nodes i and j meet with each other, they exchanges 
their witnessed node lists   and  . This can be done by piggybacking the witnessed node list in the 
Hello message, which is typically the first message when neighbor relationship is established. If   
    , the two nodes further exchange with each other the fingerprint claims of  nodes in     . The 
two nodes then check for a possible fingerprint claim conflict with received claims. In a fingerprint claim 
conflict, there are two fingerprint claims with the same ID and private key claiming two different 
neighborhood communities, which implies two detected replicas. The procedures are listed in Algorithm 4. 
Table 1. The Fingerprint Claim Generation algorithm and the Become a Witness Node algorithm 
Algorithm 1: Fingerprint Claim Generation Algorithm 2, Become a Witness Node  
Input: none; 
Output: signed fingerprint claim. 
Input: given probability p; 
Output: None 
neighbor_list := ID of all current neighbor nodes; flag := {True/False} ← {0, 1}* with probability p. 
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id := ID of this node; 
message := id || neighbor_list; 
signed_message = message || Signsk(message); 
return signed_message; 
if flag is True: 
     add claim to local stored fingerprint claims; 
     add neighbor node id to the list of  witnessed nodes; 
 
Table 2. The Fingerprint Local Verification algorithm and the Fingerprint Global Verification algorithm 
Algorithm 3: Fingerprint Local Verification Algorithm 4: Fingerprint Global Verification 
Input: signed fingerprint claim of a neighbor node. 
Output: True/False, indicating the validity of the claim. 
Input: None 
Output: a list of detected replicas, which might be empty. 
id := ID of this node; 
neighbor_claim := fingerprint claim of a neighbor node. 
neighbor_pk := derive neighbor public key from master 
public key and neighbor’s ID; 
if Verifyneighbor_pk(neighbor_claim) not True: 
     return False; # not a valid signature. 
else: 
     claimed_neighbors := extract neighbor list from 
neighbor_claim; 
     if id not in claimed_neighbors: 
          return False; # a forged neighbor list though with 
valid signature. 
     else:  return True; 
replica_ids := empty list; 
W1 : = the list of witnessed nodes of this node. 
W2 := the list of witnessed nodes of the meeting node. 
for each ID in     :  
     local_claim := fetch local claim of id ID from local stored claims; 
     compare_claim := fetch claim of id ID from meeting node; 
     if neighbor list of local_claim does not equal to neighbor list in 
compare_claim: # a claim conflict detected. 
          add ID to replica_ids; # i.e., add ID to detected replica list. 
return replica_ids; # return all detected replicas,which might be empty. 
5. Security and Performance Evaluations of SHD 
In this section, we give an analytical evaluation of the detection ability of SHD. The detection ability is 
characterized by the time the network takes to detect replicas. Intuitively, the shorter a detection protocol 
takes to detect replicas, the higher the detection probability will be. As mentioned before, the detection 
time of SHD is effectively an extended problem of routing latency of Mobility-Assisted Routing. 
We follow a network model defined in Section 2. The notations that will be used throughout this 
section are listed in Table. 1. 
Table 1. Notations 
K Transmission range of sensor nodes. 
  ( ) Location of node i at time t. 
  (   ) and    (   ) Meeting time of node i and j, and its mathematical expectation. 
  (   ) and    (   ) Group meeting time of node groups A and B, and its mathematical expectation. 
| | Number of nodes in node group W. 
5.1. Meeting and Group Meeting Times 
To facilitate our discussion, we first define the meeting time and the group meeting time of a WSN.  
Definition 1 (Meeting Time) and Expected Meeting Time) [12]. Let nodes i and j, start from their 
stationary distribution at time 0, move in a WSN deployment field according to a mobility model. The 
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meeting time    under the given mobility model of the two nodes is defined as 
  (   )     {  |  ( )    ( )|   }. The mathematical expectation of    is denoted as    . 
The time    , from the mobility-assisted routing perspective, is the time it takes node i to deliver 
message to another node j, which is the expected routing delay in direct mobility-assisted routing. 
Definition 2: (Group Meeting Time and Expected Group Meeting Time). Let two groups of nodes A 
and B, start from their stationary distribution at time 0, move in a WSN deployment field according to a 
mobility model. The group meeting time    of the two node groups under the given mobility model is 
defined as   (   )     {  |  ( )    ( )|           }. The mathematical expectation of    is 
denoted as    . 
5.2. Detection delay of SHD under popular mobility models 
In this section, we give analytical results of the detection delay of SHD under popular mobility models, 
namely the Random Waypoint Model, the Random Walk model, and the Random Direction model. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are two replicas in the network. In fact, injecting more 
replicas in a clone attack means a higher probability to be detected. Suppose there are 2 replicas,    and    
in a WSN. Let  and   denote the set of all witness nodes of   and   , respectively. Once any node 
    and any node     meet with each other, a fingerprint claim conflict will be detected by i and j 
according to the node verification phase procedures defined in section 4.2 since i and j carry different 
fingerprint claims from    and   . Therefore, the group meeting time    is in fact the detection delay of 
our proposed SHD protocol. 
The expected meeting time of Random Walk model is given in [13]. The expected meeting times of 
Random Direction model and Random Waypoint model are given in [14]. We establish the connection of 
Group Meeting Time    and Meeting Time    in Theorem 1, which is based on the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: The meeting time under Random Walk model has an exponentially distributed tail; the 
meeting times under Random Direction or Random Waypoint models have approximately exponentially 
distributed tails. 
Proof: See [12] and [15]. 
Theorem 1: Let sensor nodes move according to a given mobility model with exponentially distributed 
meeting times, the relation of group meeting time   (     ) of two node groups   and  , and the 
meeting time   , is given as follows, 
  (     )  
  
|  |  |  |
 
Proof (skeleton): According to the definition of   (     ), we have 
  (     )     {  (   )          } 
Since all nodes move independently according to the given mobility model, the meeting times 
{  (   )          }  are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponentially distributed 
random variables, with mathematical expectation    . Therefore, the minimum value of |     | such 
variables is also an exponential random variable with mathematical expectation 
  (     )  
  
|  |  |  |
 
Since all communications in SHD happen in single-hop distance, the protocol is fully distributed and 
high robust against routing attacks and node colluding attacks. The analysis in this section also show that 
the SHD protocol is quite efficient and user-tunable, e.g., by selecting a larger set of witness nodes groups 
for each node to reduce the detection time since the detection time is inversely proportional to the number 
of nodes in each witness nodes group. 
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6. Conclusion 
Node replication attack is a great threat to the security of wireless sensor networks. Existing detection 
protocols fail to hold in mobile WSNs, or if nodes collude to subvert the detection protocol. In this paper, 
we propose a novel scheme for detecting node clone attacks in mobile WSNs, namely the Single Hop 
Detection (SHD) protocol, which is fully distributed in that all communication happens between single 
hop neighbours, highly robust against node colluding, and highly efficient. 
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